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Abstract 
This paper aims at giving empirical content to the notion of social capital for regional 
development issues. It first provides a typology of both positive and negative influences of 
sociological factors on economic performance, and a set of available social capital indicators. 
Second, using the results of four case studies, the relevance of these indicators is assessed. 
Third, it presents an econometric study on the role of social capital on economic development. 
The results show that both local cohesion (“bonding”) and external social links (“bridging”) 
are important in order to define social capital and explain performance.  
Regional Development, Social Capital, Case Studies, Indicators, Rural Areas. 
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Le but de cet article est de construire une méthode de mesure empirique de la notion de 
capital pour les questions de développement régional. Nous commençons par proposer une 
typologie des mécanismes positifs et négatifs par lesquels les facteurs sociologiques influent 
sur la performance économique, ainsi qu’une liste d’indicateurs reliés à ces mécanismes. Puis, 
à l’aide des résultats de quatre études de cas, nous évaluons la pertinence de ces indicateurs. 
Enfin, nous présentons une application économétrique. Les résultats montrent que la cohésion 
locale (« bonding ») et les liens sociaux extérieurs (« bridging ») sont tous deux importants 
pour définir le capital social et expliquer la performance économique. 
Développement Régional, Capital Social, Etudes de Cas, Indicateurs, Zones Rurales. 
 
JEL Classifications: A13, R11, Z13 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been a revival of interest about the role of sociological factors in 
explaining development in lagging areas. The attractive notion of “social capital” has been 
popularised (after PUTNAM’s (1993) seminal works) by the World Bank’s Social Capital 
Initiative launched in 1996. It gave rise to an unprecedented excitement among researchers 
concerned with development issues, associating not only economists, but also sociologists and 
political scientists. Whereas early studies on social capital concerned developing countries, 
more recent work transferred the concept to developed countries, especially to rural or 
peripheral regions (RUPASINGHA et al., 2002, IYER et al, 2005, BEUGELSDIJK and VAN SHAIK, 
2005). 
However, the notion of social capital also gave rise to much controversy. One 
important difficulty in assessing the actual role of social capital in economic performance is 
the lack of relevant indicators. Usual indicators include the density of associations, trust 
indicators, and crude measures such as the size of households or ethnolinguistic 
fragmentation. The problem with these measures is that there is only a presumption that they 
proxy for attributes such as the propensity for collective action. Besides, the positive 
correlations found in empirical studies do not demonstrate a positive impact of social capital 
on economic performance, as the causal relations at stake may be much more complex.  
Consequently, even if a statistical approach is irreplaceable in order to perform 
statistical tests about the relationships between economic and sociological phenomena, 
fieldwork is also irreplaceable to determine relevant indicators and have a clearer view of the 
actual mechanisms that statistical analysis captures. The aim of this article is to provide new 
results in both directions. First, we present the results of four case studies on contrasted 
French rural regions. Comparing these four regions gives a better view of the relevance of 
classical usual social capital indicators. Moreover, it gives useful insights into the links 
between sociological behaviour and development dynamics. Second, we present a simple 
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econometric study on French rural areas in order to assess the generality of our findings. The 
results suggest that some indicators widely used in social capital studies should be considered 
with caution. They also show the importance of considering both indicators of local social 
cohesion and of external social links. 
Choosing rural areas as case studies is interesting because sociological characteristics 
are thought to be more homogenous and stable in time. Moreover, it is fashionable in political 
discourses to consider that rural development can be enhanced by local factors of cohesion 
and identity. Besides, there are high variations in the level of local cohesion between rural 
communities (especially in France), which makes the countryside interesting for testing the 
relation between sociological characteristics and development. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly presents the 
mechanisms by which sociological characteristics can influence economic performance, and 
enumerates the indicators that can be used to measure the relevant sociological characteristics. 
Then, we give the results of four case studies in which sociological characteristics have been 
measured by interviews with inhabitants and local institutions. It assesses the relevance of 
some statistical indicators in the light of the results of these interviews. Last, we present the 
econometric study. The final section concludes and gives suggestions for future research. 
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FROM ECONOMIC MECHANISMS TO CLASSES OF INDICATORS 
 
Sociological features have not been much taken into account in mainstream economics until 
recently. However, there are many ways by which sociological factors could impact on 
economic success. We first present them in a synthetic way. Then, we discuss which 
indicators can be used to measure the relevant sociological characteristics in empirical studies. 
 
An overview of the impact of sociological factors on economic performance 
Many definitions of social capital have been used in academic literature. We shall use LIN’s 
(2001) definition of social capital, which has the advantage of being both operational and 
comprehensive: “resources embedded in a social structure, which are accessed/mobilized in 
purposive actions”. According to this definition, social capital does not consist in social 
networks per se, but in the resources that these networks may give access to. Similarly, norms 
of collective action are useless unless there are projects to co-operate on. While Lin’s 
definition is quite operational at the individual level, it is less clear whether this notion makes 
sense at a collective level, in particular if the system under study is quite large, such as a 
region or a country. Nevertheless, the idea that a region whose inhabitants have a lot of social 
capital will on the whole perform better is convincing, for at least three reasons. 
First, social capital implies many social links, some of which may transmit valuable 
information. Relevant information is often costly, and the ones who have easier access to it 
may have a decisive advantage. Because knowledge is more and more specialised and 
fragmented, having information about new technologies, potential demand, or matching 
partners can be essential for regional development. 
According to R. BURT (2000), from an individual’s point of view dense social 
networks are likely to convey rather commonplace information. Conversely, weak ties, 
connecting different social groups, will usually bring more original information. However, 
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such information also tends to be less reliable. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between weak 
(original and diverse information) and strong (reliable information) ties. At the regional level, 
PUTNAM (2000) introduced a similar distinction between what he termed bonding and 
bridging social capital. Bonding social capital involves strong and redundant ties, whereas 
bridging social capital involves loose but non-redundant ties, i.e. ties than span different 
social worlds. In the following, we shall see the relevance of that distinction for other 
phenomena as well1. 
The second class of mechanisms by which social relationships may play a positive role 
concerns opportunism problems. This can be because there are frequent interactions, which 
discourage cheating. This can also stem from a purely psychological effect (individuals 
internalize the community’s interests). Whatever its source, the prevalence of trust and loyalty 
allows a substantial decrease in transaction costs. Economic agents save on resources in 
contracting, management and monitoring, as many relationships are informal.  
Third, social relationships facilitate collective action, and in particular informal 
insurance mechanisms. One of the best-known examples in development studies is rotating 
credit associations or tontines. Mutual aid can be a crucial element in societies that lack 
efficient risk management institutions. Uncertainty management can also consist in smoothing 
various fluctuations of the economic activity. For instance, the workforce may be managed by 
a pool of firms according to their needs. Collective action may also involve the production of 
public goods (such as common waste management, a marketing study or advertising 
campaign), which remedies another type of market imperfection, namely the presence of high 
fixed costs.  
A significant weakness in social capital literature is that the negative impacts of social 
capital are seldom taken into account (PORTES and LANDOLT, 1995). By our definition, social 
capital is always valuable for a rational individual. But it may have collectively negative 
effects. First, social relationships may discourage economic agents to seek new (and better) 
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economic opportunities. When agents are embedded in a social structure, they do not tend to 
devise an optimal search of the best partners available. Social capital between members of a 
group may thus result in long-term mismatching and more generally inefficient allocation of 
resources.  
Another negative effect is the fact that individuals tend to have low individual 
incentives, for at least two reasons. First, a strong embeddedness in social networks may tend 
to promote a conservative or timid behaviour, because a conspicuous behaviour will be badly 
considered by peers2. Consequently, innovative and risky behaviour will be rare. Second, 
safety nets provided by the community will not push individuals to do their best.  
The third kind of mechanism we consider includes all exclusion effects, and in 
particular the classical rent-seeking behaviour through collusion. This includes for instance 
refusing to hire job seekers that are not of the “right social group”. From a sociological point 
of view, exclusion can have very negative effects for the excluded people, who are unable to 
access the social capital of the group. But it can also lead to losses for the group that practices 
it, as an outsider may well be able to bring valuable skills to the group.  
This presentation of both positive and negative mechanisms shows that the definition 
of social capital must at least be bidimensional. Bonding social capital (i.e. strong links) and 
bridging social capital (i.e. weaker links giving access to new resources) have conflicting 
effects. Bonding social capital can solve agency and collective action problems, but also 
fosters redundancy of information, low incentives, collusion and discrimination. Conversely, 
bridging social capital is essential for bringing new ideas and opportunities, but the potential 
resources it carries are much less reliable. Consequently, no single indicator can encompass 
all the phenomena that are grouped together under the label “social capital”. Two empirical 
predictions also stem from this discussion. First, bonding and bridging have no reason to be 
positively linked and both should impact economic performance. Second, the effect of 
bonding social capital should be non-linear because of the mix between positive and negative 
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effect. This feature, also raised by BOSCHMA (2005) about the relationship between proximity 
and innovation, is coherent with empirical works that find a “bell-shaped” relationship 
between embeddedness and performance (e.g. UZZI, 1996). When embeddedness is low, it has 
a positive impact on performance, but after some threshold, embeddedness is detrimental to 
performance. 
Most statistical studies on social capital rely either on specific questionnaires 
conducted in a few regions (IYER et al, 2005) or on survey information based on national 
samples (KNACK and KEEFER, 1997; BEUGELSDIJK and VAN SCHAIK, 2005). In the first case, 
the replication of the results is often questionable, whereas in the latter it is not possible to get 
information at a local level. Here, we try to get both local information and generality, by 
associating case studies and statistical data. In what follows, we present a list of indicators 
that may capture the relevant aspects of social capital involved in the foregoing mechanisms.  
 
Indicators for bonding social capital 
To examine how to measure bonding social capital, we first consider each mechanism 
again: 
- Concerning information transmission, the bonding aspect of social capital mainly involves 
the density of social links.  
- Incentives problems may be solved either by norms of loyalty or by a strong social 
control. The former may be revealed by a high degree of trust or of sociological 
homogeneity. The latter may be measured by the density of strong links. 
- Collective action could be eased by the sociological homogeneity of the concerned group, 
provided that a relevant norm of co-operation exists. 
- Restriction of opportunities will appear when the openness of social networks is too 
restricted. This problem echoes the first point. 
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- Insufficient incentives will appear when the society is too conservative, and not enough 
open to outer competition. 
- The effects of collusion and discrimination should become apparent at a regional level 
when the society is fragmented into clear-cut subgroups. 
At first sight, the enumeration above does not leave much hope of finding simple 
measures of social capital. At least the following aspect should be accounted for: 
- Homogeneity of social status in the local society. It is difficult to find a reliable indicator 
for that feature. Here, the Gini index on household incomes was used3.  
- Norms of trust/loyalty/reciprocity. The criminality rate could be a proxy for distrust, 
because of its declarative nature. It has the drawback of incorporating other phenomena, 
which have nothing to do with trust. Another potential indicator is religious practice. This 
indicator does not seem relevant for a study in France, because of the importance of 
secularism, and the fact that the mix of catholic and protestant regions, makes it 
impossible to build a single meaningful measure. Two other measures have been chosen 
in this study. First, the ratio of household having their name on the telephone directory 
appeared to be a promising proxy for trust4. Second, gifts to charities were used as an 
indicator of the propensity to co-operate. 
- Norms of co-operation. They are difficult to capture by statistical indicators. For co-
operation in the agricultural sector, we used the average farm size. The smaller the farms, 
the more collective action is likely to have been important to preserve farm employment5. 
Concerning political co-operation, a simple indicator is the “fiscal integration coefficient”. 
It measures the average percentage of fiscal resources that are shared between 
municipalities. Of course, this rests on the assumption that co-operation between 
politicians is correlated to co-operation in general, which needs to be tested.  
- Norms of conservatism. There is no obvious indicator for that, although we looked at the 
vote to conservative parties. 
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- Density of local (strong) social networks. It is typically measured by the density of 
associations. Other possible indicators include data on household structure, socialisation 
places, and commuting (high commuting distances could imply less social life). Although 
none of these measures directly captures the intensity of interaction between individuals, 
they are generally considered as reasonable proxies for sociability. 
 Statistical studies generally focus on one aspect of social capital, e.g. norms of trust or 
association density (DURLAUF AND FAFCHAMPS, 2004). Here, we choose to measure these 
different aspects together, whenever possible, and examine the relationships between each 
other.  
 
Indicators for bridging social capital 
 Bridging social capital mostly involves the transmission of new information to the 
agents that need it. Operationally, it will be defined here as links with individuals outside the 
region, which may give access to new information and opportunities6.  
Bridging can take many forms for development issues, but we will restrict here to 
three main types. First, emigration and immigration are a source of bridging, because 
migrants generally keep in touch with people from their former place of residence. Second, 
relationships inside the economic world can generate new opportunities and direct the 
localisation of future investment decisions. The third form will be labelled “political 
relationships” (taken on a broad sense, including politicians, businessmen and so on). It is 
based on the fact that local leaders can have acquaintances at higher levels, which can give 
them access to valuable resources. Unfortunately, former empirical studies on social capital 
have not much taken into account the bridging component, so the assessment of the validity 
of bridging indicators will be more difficult than for the other indicators. 
Let us deal with emigration first. Three elements must be taken into account: the 
density of links between emigrants and their former regions, the existence of resources in the 
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former region, and the possibility for emigrants to access them. An “emigration bridging 
indicator” is computed as follows. Suppose we study a set of R regional units on which we 
want to measure bridging social capital. We also consider a set of U urban poles, where most 
important resources are supposed to be located. This assumption is motivated by both 
empirical and theoretical research on agglomeration processes, and the well-known role of 
agglomeration on innovation. For each regional unit, we sum an “access to outer resources 
from emigrants” index over all urban poles. This index is the product of three factors: 
- Migration rate, computed as the share of inhabitants of the urban pole in the latest census 
(year t) who resided in the regional unit during the former census (year t–1)7. 
- Level of resources in the urban pole, which is proxied by the logarithm of employment. 
- Access to these resources by emigrants, which is measured by an index of similarity 
between social categories. 
Formally, the emigration bridging indicator is computed by the following equation: 
6
, ,
1 1
1ln . 1
2
U
i j k i j k j
i i
j ki i j i j j
M M N
emigrationbridging E
NM M M N
→ →
= =→ →
   
 = − −    +    
∑ ∑  (1) 
where j sums over all urban poles, E denotes employment in period t, M the number of 
migrants from regional unit i to urban pole j during the period [t–1,t], and NM non migrants of 
regional unit i during the same period. Index k splits the population of migrants (M) and of the 
urban poles (N) in period t into 6 social categories: farm owners, independent workers, 
executives, intermediary occupations, clerks, and factory workers. 
A similar index is constructed for immigration. Here we consider migration from 
urban poles to regional units. Our similarity index now compares the distribution of migrants 
across social categories to the distributions of residents of the regional unit (and not of the 
urban poles as for emigration bridging). Formally: 
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6
, ,
1 1
1ln . 1
2
U
j i k j i k i
i i
j ki j i j i i
M M N
immigrationbridging E
NM M M N
→ →
= =→ →
   
 = − −    +    
∑ ∑  (2) 
Turning to the second form of bridging social capital, business networks, we used data 
about multiplant firms. This does not reflect the diversity of business relationships, and in 
particular neglects the role of mutual shareholding between firms. As many plants in 
underdevelopped areas belong to larger firms, we assume that data about multiplant firms 
capture a significant part of business relationships between locations.  
We can compute two types of indicators: 
- First, a “head office indicator”, which takes into account the fluxes from head offices to 
subordinate plants. It is the sum, over all other regions, of the number of workers 
“depending” of the region of interest, weighted by the resource level indicator (logarithm 
of employment again). 
- Second, a “subordinate plant indicator”, which takes into account the fluxes from 
subordinate plants to head offices. It is computed by doing the reverse operation. 
Formally, denote i the region of interest, and let Wij be the number of workers in another 
region j, who work for a firm whose head office is in region i. The two indicators are 
computed as follows: 
∑
=
=
U
j
jij
i
i EWE
headoffice
1
ln1   (3)  and ∑
=
=
U
j
jji
i
i EWE
backoffice
1
ln1   (4) 
where j sums over all urban poles again. 
A high density of outer links to a region full of resources alone cannot ensure that 
these links will indeed convey some of these resources. For many successful projects (e.g. the 
settlement of a new firm), the critical factor of success may be the existence of a particular 
relationship (for instance the fact that a local politician has acquaintances in business circles). 
However, it seems reasonable to consider that the probability of having access to outer 
resources increases with the number of outer links. 
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This leads us to consider political relationships as a source of bridging social capital. 
Little can be said about the accurate mechanisms that bring new opportunities to a region by 
that channel. Some indicators could be proposed to capture them however. The turnout on 
local and on professional elections could proxy for the elected member’s performance. 
However, many factors can influence electoral turnout, which have nothing to do with the 
politicians’ efficiency to form outer links, in particular other sociological features. Moreover, 
there is clearly a reverse causation from economic performance to electoral turnout. The 
number of subsidies obtained by communities seems to be a better indicator, provided that 
uniform rules are applied on the study area. Public subsidies cover various topics, many of 
which have little direct relationship to economic performance (e.g. grants for cultural events). 
This decreases the risk of endogeneity associated with this indicator. 
Table 1 sums up the indicators that were used in this research. We now present the 
fieldwork that was conducted to assess the relevance of these indicators, before proceeding to 
econometric analysis. 
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
TESTING STATISTICAL INDICATORS: FOUR CASE STUDIES 
 
The case study areas 
In order to test our indicators, we selected four case study areas that display a high variability 
according to two criteria: economic dynamism and sociological characteristics. These areas 
were small regions are known as “pays”. “Pays” is a French word that can mean “country”, 
but also (according to XIXth century geographer Vidal de la Blache) “a small region with 
roughly homogenous characteristics”. Here however, it refers to a public policy that has been 
implemented since 1999 in order to encourage local leaders in rural areas to group together 
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and build common development strategies based on a contract with the national government. 
This contract opens the possibility for various subsidies. The “pays” is the geographical area 
resulting from this contract8.  
 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
Table 2 gives some figures about the four zones (see figure 1 for their geographical 
location). Economic dynamism was assessed by simple indicators (employment growth, 
average income). The level of co-operation was assessed by looking at former empirical 
works, notably of co-operation in the agricultural sector. Here is a short description of the four 
pays:  
- The pays de Saint-Flour is a mountainous region, and its economy is based on cattle 
breeding. It has undergone a sharp decline of both population and employment. Although 
it is well connected by highway (and to a lesser extent by railway) to the metropolitan 
areas of Clermont-Ferrand and Montpellier, very few initiatives have emerged in order to 
take advantage of the many possible opportunities based on its gorgeous landscape and 
typical food products.  
- The pays de Dinan is well known for having a rich cultural and social life. There is a 
strong co-operative movement in the agricultural sector, which leads to postulate a high 
level of social capital. However, it has undergone a rather declining economic evolution, 
compared to the nearby labour market areas of Rennes, Saint-Malo, and Saint-Brieuc.  
- The pays Loire-Beauce is situated in the rich alluvial plain of the Bassin Parisien. It is a 
rich area thanks to agriculture, but has also undergone high employment growth due to 
many recent industrial settlements. Population and local institutions are known to display 
a high individualism. This feature is made clear by the small size of the pays as well as by 
the absence of fiscal integration between municipalities.  
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- Lastly, the pays du Forez is situated at the periphery of the sharply declining industrial 
basin of Saint-Etienne. It displays a very positive economic dynamism however (notably 
in the industrial sector), and is in particular the place of many collective initiatives.  
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
These study areas were chosen in order to represent four contrasted cases: poor economic 
dynamism and poor local co-operation (pays de Saint-Flour), poor economic dynamism and 
high local co-operation (pays de Dinan), high economic dynamism and poor local co-
operation (pays Loire-Beauce), and high economic dynamism and high social co-operation 
(pays du Forez).  
 
Methodology 
Information was collected from two sources, during spring and early summer 2004. 
First, detailed interviews were performed with local institutions (municipalities, development 
agencies, chambers of commerce, business associations and so on). They allowed us to 
characterise the local governance, and investigate in detail the actual phenomena at work 
between sociological, institutional and economic features. This material includes many 
striking examples of success or failure of collective actions. Second, interviews of the 
population were performed. In each study area, 50 inhabitants answered a questionnaire 
dealing with the various aspects of social capital. Although the sample in each area is very 
small, we tried to make it as representative as possible, by stratifying it ex ante by age and 
type of zone (urban or rural). The age of interviewed people was obtained using electoral 
crolls. When computing averages, the sample was stratified ex post by socio-economic 
category and employment status. 
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The questions were split into three categories: social norms (norms of 
trust/loyalty/reciprocity, co-operation and conservatism), local social networks and “bridging 
social capital” (outer links and more generally openness).  The results of the survey were then 
compared to the indicators listed in table 1. All indicators are presented in table 3. Note that 
several indicators have no equivalent in the survey: social homogeneity, collective action, 
conservatism, and business networks. These features were grasped through the qualitative 
interviews with local leaders. 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
Note that due to data availability constraints, different years are used for different 
indicators. For each indicator, we tried to use the latest data available. Concerning average 
farm size, we choose 1970 in order to take into account the productivity gains which occurred 
since the 1940s, but to avoid most distortions due to the CAP regulations, in particular the 
regulations for preventing overproduction9.  
Naturally, we should keep in mind that answers to questionnaires can be biased by 
subjectivity and framing effects, especially for questions about social norms. That is why 
detailed interviews were a precious tool to corroborate the results of the survey.  
 
Qualitative results 
Before comparing the results of the surveys and the statistical indicators, we give for each 
pays a brief synthesis of the qualitative interviews with local leaders. 
- In the pays de Saint-Flour, most interviewees declare to be proud of belonging to that 
pays. However, collective action turns out to be difficult in every field. Co-operation is 
always difficult between municipalities, even for mundane operations such as organising a 
common school or co-ordinating tourism offices. It is the same between firms, even when 
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synergies are clearly possible, as in the food or tourism sectors. Both the population and 
local leaders are generally very pessimistic about the future, and do not like newcomers, 
which leads to a vicious cycle of isolation. 
- In the pays de Dinan, by contrast, working together is like a second nature. There are 
countless examples of co-operation between municipalities. The situation is similar in the 
economic world. There are several entrepreneur associations, which allow various 
collective actions such as recruiting the workforce, advertising and so on. They are also 
used to negotiate together with local authorities. There is no hostility towards newcomers, 
as this area has long been the place of many migrations. 
- In the pays Loire-Beauce, most interviewees consider the inhabitants of the pays as 
individualistic and distrustful. The absence of fiscal integration between municipalities 
does not mean that common actions between municipalities are absent however. In fact, 
there are many common actions, but they are limited to precise topics such as waste 
management, water supply, school transportation and so on. Conversely, in the economic 
world, common actions are virtually non-existent. This is due to the fact that most 
establishments belong to larger firms, and very fe  complementarities are to be found 
between them within the pays. The fact that employment growth is high is mostly due to 
the strategic position of the pays near highways and national roads, not to the existence of 
specific resources.  
- In the pays du Forez, co-operations are still rare between municipalities, but are 
widespread in the economic sector. Interestingly, there are even co-operations between 
establishments of larger firms, for instance for waste management, which contrasts with 
the pays Loire-Beauce. For smaller firms, the quality of relationships between 
entrepreneurs and workforce has many times been noted. According to many 
interviewees, there is no historical identity, but a new identity is slowly building thanks to 
the pays policy. The pays is very open to migrations, due to its geographical situation. 
Page 17 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 18 
Many executives from the nearby area of Saint-Etienne are attracted by the positive image 
of the pays. 
 
Quantitative results 
We now present the quantitative results. Probit analysis was used to see on which 
variables pays had statistically different values. Average values for each pays are given in 
table 410. 
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
Beginning with social norms and social homogeneity indicators, the Gini index turns 
out to be a poor predictor of social cohesion. It takes its highest value in Saint-Flour, probably 
the most stable and conservative study areas. It does not help to predict the level of collective 
action either, as the low value in Loire-Beauce shows. 
Measures of trust yield consistent result, with the noticeable exception of the pays de 
Dinan. Survey results suggest a low level of trust, while the phonebook indicator gives a high 
value, which is consistent with the interviews with local leaders. In fact, informal 
conversation with some inhabitants at the end of the questionnaire showed that even those 
who stated that they do not trust others are fond of engaging in collective activities. A 
plausible interpretation is that in Dinan, there is a high trust between known people, but not 
with outsiders. Consequently, the trust indicator used in the questionnaire (which measures 
how much people trust others in general) should be used with caution in development issues. 
The phonebook indicator seems to be more relevant, precisely because it mostly concerns 
relationships between known people. 
A similar interpretation should explain the surprisingly low value of the lend question 
indicator (which measures the propensity to lend money to others, see table 3) for the pays de 
Page 18 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 19 
Dinan, which seems contradictory with the high value for charity gifts. Measures of charity 
gifts are consistent between survey and indicators, which is not surprising given the objective 
nature of the question. They may measure the tendency to share with other people. The value 
is especially low for the pays Loire-Beauce (20%), consistently with the qualitative 
interviews.  
The results of the two collective action indicators fit remarkably well with the results 
of the qualitative interview. For average farm size, the mechanism is particularly clear in 
Dinan, where the strong collective will to preserve agricultural employment led to a 
widespread development of intensive pig and poultry breeding. Conversely, in the pays de 
Saint-Flour, where agricultural development could be based on high quality products, we 
observe on the contrary a concentration of property and vast farms producing generic goods. 
However, the reason why co-operation in agriculture should spill over to other sectors is 
unclear though, so that indicator should not be used alone.  
Lastly, the conservative vote rate correctly predicts the high parochialism of the pays 
de Saint-Flour, but appears to be of little value in predicting co-operation in general (see for 
instance the result of the pays Loire-Beauce). Conservative parties not only promote 
conservative values, but also free market options, so the interpretation of this indicator is 
difficult. 
The results on local social networks point out that the level of sociability is high in 
Saint-Flour and low in Loire-Beauce. For the two other pays, the picture is more mixed. 
Survey results and their statistical counterparts display some important differences, which is 
not surprising, given the very indirect nature of indicators such as the number of sport 
facilities per capita, and the poor quality of the association membership indicator. Average 
household size seems totally unrelated to sociability in general, and its low variability makes 
it a poor indicator anyway. Bar density seems to be a good proxy for sociability, 
notwithstanding the awkward result for Forez, in which the qualitative interviews suggest that 
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informal sociability is high. A possible explanation is that there have been many recent 
changes in the pays (numerous newcomers and the implementation of collective actions 
thanks to the pays policy), so the rise in sociability has not been yet translated into places of 
sociability. A noteworthy feature is that sociability is not directly related to collective action, 
nor is trust, as the case of Saint-Flour illustrates.  
Indicators about personal outer links display a striking inconsistency between the 
declarations of interviewees and other sources of information. The results of the 
questionnaires suggest that the pays de Saint-Flour is very open and rich in outer links, 
whereas both interviews with local leaders and statistical data show the opposite. According 
to the interviews, the most open pays is Loire-Beauce, whereas Dinan and Forez occupy 
intermediary situations. This is consistent with the results of the statistical indicators. 
Consequently, random surveys as the one used here appear to be a poor tool for assessing the 
level of bridging social capital. This is because there is more to bridging than just links 
outside the region. Moreover, the number of outer links matters less than the potential 
resources they carry. Thus, unless detailed enquiries are possible to analyse in depth the 
structure of relationships outside a region, fieldwork will generally be insufficient to assess 
bridging social capital. 
Turning to the business network indicators, the results confirm the information 
gathered in the interviews, namely that Saint-Flour is very isolated economically. The 
qualitative interviews did not make it possible to rank the three other pays according to 
theirexternal economic networks. According to the indicators, Dinan appears to be the most 
open of all, followed by Forez and Loire-Beauce. The results of both migration and business 
networks indicators thus prove to rank the study areas in approximately the same order.  
Last, measures about local politics yield some interesting results. First, the local 
elections turnout survey measure is totally unrelated to its statistical counterpart. The highest 
discrepancy between statement and reality is to be found in the pays Loire-Beauce and the 
Page 20 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 21 
pays du Forez, where the actual turnout is also the lowest. The highest turnout is in the pays 
de Saint-Flour. Surprisingly, there is an inverse relationship between knowledge of the pays 
and interest in local governance. The latter is very low in the pays Loire-Beauce and the pays 
du Forez (consistently with actual turnout, but not with declared turnout). It is quite high in 
the pays de Saint-Flour. The main lesson from the results on political indicators is that 
electoral turnout is not related to any measure of social capital nor political performance. 
Similarly, the subsidies indicator is poorly related to the political power that showed through 
the interviews. It is high in Forez (where no influential political leader is reported) and low in 
the pays de Dinan, whose president is a member of the national Parliament. 
In summary, here are the most relevant indicators for measuring the various components 
of social capital found in the case studies: 
- The phonebook indicator seems to be a reasonable proxy for trust. As we saw in Saint-
Flour, trust alone does not imply collective action. However, it should be a necessary 
condition for co-operation, and bring other advantages such as a low opportunism. 
- Charity gift mostly seems to work best as a “negative indicator” indicating areas with low 
reciprocity, as the case of Loire-Beauce shows. Again, a high value of this indicator does 
not imply collective action. 
- Average farm size fares well as an indicator of collective action. However, nothing 
guarantees that it would work so well in other areas (think for instance of wine producing 
areas, where farms are usually small). 
- Fiscal integration seems a good indicator as well, provided that the behaviour of mayors 
reflects the general behaviour of the population, which our case studies tend to 
corroborate. 
- Bar density gives fairly good results at predicting sociability, despite some distortions in 
low-density areas.  
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- Population bridging indicators and business link indicators fare quite well in predicting 
the area’s openness and access to outer resources via non-market relationships. 
 
AN ECONOMETRIC APPLICATION 
Case studies are not sufficient for making valuable inferences about the causal role of 
social capital on development. Our study areas differ in too many ways, and their main virtue 
is to display very contrasted situations that allowed to test the robustness of the potential 
social capital indicators. In this section, we go a step further and present a simple empirical 
test on French rural areas. Our dependent variable will be employment growth on the period 
1990-199911. Our level of study is the “bassin de vie”. Bassins de vie are statistical units that 
are designed to be economically integrated for basic services and commuting (INSEE, 2003). 
They are defined by statistical criteria satisfying two requirements. First, for a list of services 
considered as “basic”, most inhabitants do not get out of the bassin de vie. Second, they must 
be integrated with regard to commuting: most inhabitants of a bassin de vie work inside it. 
There are 1745 bassins de vie in France classified as rural, whose average population 
of rural bassins de vie is of about 12 000 inhabitants, with a standard deviation of 9 500 
inhabitants. While it is somewhat heterogeneous, this scale of study proved to be relevant for 
studying both economic and sociological relationships. We restricted the sample by excluding 
Corsica and bassins de vie with less than 2000 inhabitants. We were then left with 1704 units. 
 
Building social capital indices 
To build social capital indices, we use the indicators of the last section, except that social 
capital variables are now taken at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1990) whenever possible. 
This makes reverse causation less likely. Moreover, all indicators were normalised and 
centered.  
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As social norms indicators and structural indicators happen to be strongly positively 
correlated, we group them together, and first perform a principal component analysis (PCA) 
on all bonding social capital indicators12. Consistently with the findings of the case studies, 
several variables appear to be irrelevant to measure social capital13:  
- Both the Gini index and the share of commuters have the counterintuitive property of 
being positively linked to other bonding variables. It seems that more inequality of income 
is associated with more trust and reciprocity norms, and that more commuting is 
associated with more sociability.  
- Household size is negatively correlated to other bonding indicators. 
- Fiscal integration appears to be unrelated to other social capital variables (in the PCA, it 
becomes important only in the fourth component).  
- Last, conservative vote is positively related to other measures of bonding social capital, 
but the case studies suggest it is associated with “bad” bonding (i.e. leading to closure and 
exclusion).  
Consequently, all these variables were dropped from the analysis. We also excluded the 
“sport facilities” variable, given its poor performance in case studies. We thus keep only five 
measures of bonding social capital, viz. charity gifts, phonebook indicators, inverse farm size, 
density of bars/cafés and density of associations. The weights of each variable in the three 
first components of the corresponding PCA are given in table 5. 
 
Insert table 5 about here 
 
Satisfactorily, all variables contribute positively to the first component. This component 
appears to measure the idea of “sociability”. Indeed, among the variables that contribute the 
most to it are the number of associations and the density of bars/cafés. The phonebook 
indicator (trust indicator) is also an indicator of the propensity to interact with people. The 
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second component is more difficult to interpret. As the two variables most associated with it 
are charity gifts and inverse farm size (proxy of co-operation in agriculture), it is tempting to 
consider it as being a measure of “reciprocity” or of “openness to others”. 
 
Things are clearer concerning bridging indicators (table 6). Migrations and business 
networks are positively correlated, again consistently with case studies. Political phenomena 
(mainly forming the third component) appear to be independent of the former.  
 
Insert table 6 about here 
 
Estimation results 
In order to see whether our social capital indicators are related to economic mechanisms, 
we perform simple econometric estimations. Our dependent variable is employment growth 
on the period 1990-1999. We use five control variables14:  
- The sum of 1990 population (in thousands) of the neighbouring units weighed by distance, 
as a measure of market potential. 
- The share of industrial employment (excluding food processing).  
- The share of residential employment, defined as all activities which are linked to the 
population (INSEE, 2003), such as real estate, retail sector, education, and 
administrations. 
- The ratio of qualified workers to non-qualified workers as a first human capital indicator. 
- The share of the population between 15 and 60 who own at least the baccalaureat degree 
in 1990, as a second human capital indicator in 1990. 
As social capital variables, we use the following indices: 
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- The first two components of the PCA on the five selected bonding variables. These are 
labelled Bonding1 and Bonding2 respectively. Bonding1 is a measure of sociability, 
whereas Bonding2 proxies reciprocity.  
- The first three components of the PCA on bridging social capital indicators. These are 
labelled Bridging1, Bridging2 and Bridging3, and they respectively correspond to general 
networks (mixing migration and business), migration and political bridging social capital. 
 
Insert table 7 about here 
 
Column 1 in table 7 gives the result of the regression with control variables only. All 
variables have the expected positive sign.  
In column 2, we add social capital variables. All social capital variables have a positive 
and significant impact (at the 5% level for “political networks”). This confirms the intuition 
that all aspects of bridging social capital are important. In column 3, we added cross products 
between bonding and bridging indices, in order to examine the possibility of 
complementarities between them. It turns out that there are few interactions between bonding 
and bridging social capital. Consequently, whereas both bonding and bridging are important, 
there is little amplification effect between them.  
Last, we tested for the possibility of a non-linear effect of social capital variables (column 
4). As expected, the quadratic terms of the first component of bonding social capital have a 
negative sign. That is, there exists a threshold over which negative effects of bonding 
predominate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article provides a first step towards a better understanding of the interaction 
between sociological and economic phenomena in peripheral areas. It shows the usefulness of 
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combining case studies with econometric analysis to better grasp the meaning of the social 
capital indicators. It demonstrates that social capital is at least bi-dimensional, including a 
bonding (local cohesion) and a bridging (outer links) component. Econometric estimations 
give promising results. They show that all these components of social capital are important, 
and suggest the existence of saturation effects (i.e. when bonding is too strong, it decreases 
performance). However, while our results corroborate the relevance of bonding social capital 
for economic performance, much work remains to be done to address causality issues. Two 
very tricky issues are the possibility of reverse causation and the fact that social capital 
indicators may in fact proxy for institutional performance (DURLAUF and FAFCHAMPS, 2004). 
Concerning the latter issue, our case studies suggest that the functioning of local institutions 
and the efficiency of local leaders is for a large part conditioned by the sociological 
background. Concerning the possibility of a reverse causation between sociological features 
and economic performance, more thorough investigations (both theoretical and empirical) 
must be done. However, using beginning of period variables for social capital parameters 
tempers the risk of reverse causation. Despite these limitations, this work provides 
encouraging results about the role of social capital in regional development. Indirect as our 
indicators might be, the relationships between them suggest that they capture relevant aspects 
of what is meant by “social capital”. Moreover, case studies and econometric analysis gave on 
the whole coherent results. Both suggest the existence of robust relationships between the 
sociological and economic spheres. As sociological factors are more and more taken into 
account in the design of local development policies, deepening the understanding of the 
mechanisms by which social capital fosters development is essential. One of the main 
messages to be taken from this work is that although cohesion and co-operation often play a 
significant role, more attention should be given to external links as a factor of development. 
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Figure 1. The four case study areas 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Social capital indicators tested in this study 
Class of phenomenon Indicators 
Social homogeneity Gini index on income 
Trust, loyalty, reciprocity Rate of phone users not on the directory, charity gifts 
Co-operation Average farm size, fiscal integration coefficient 
Conservatism Vote for conservative parties 
Density of local links Participation in associations, average household size, density of 
bars and sport facilities, share of commuters 
Bridging social capital  Emigration/immigration indicators, business links, electoral 
turnout, number of subsidies granted 
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Table 2. Some features of the four case studies 
 Saint-Flour Dinan Loire-Beauce Forez 
Size (km²) 2 511 1 393 767 1 959 
# of municipalities 105 79 40 136 
Population 1999 (thousands) 40.0 100.4 46.4 160.3 
Population growth 1990-99 -9% -1% +4% +6% 
Employment 1999 (thousands) 15.3 32.2 14.8 54.7 
Employment growth 1990-99 -7% -1% +10% +9% 
Agriculture share 1999 28% 13% 7% 6% 
Industry share 1999 9% 16% 30% 31% 
Baccalaureat holders 1999 20% 23% 25% 26% 
Mean income per household 1999 (€) 20 024 23 739 29 981 26 176 
Mean distance to highway (km) 20 8 8 10 
Mean time to metropolitan area 72’ 20’ 27’ 23’ 
Source: INSEE. 
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Table 3. Survey questions and statistical indicators 
Class Survey questions Indicators 
Social norms and social homogeneity 
Social 
homogeneity 
 Gini index on household income 
(2001) 
Trust and 
reciprocity 
Refusal rate  
Trust indicator: percentage of people 
agreeing that: “most people can be trusted” 
Charity gifts indicator: percentage of 
people who gave money for charity in past 
twelve months. 
Lend question indicator: average number 
of people to whom the interviewees would 
lend “an important sum of money”. 
Phonebook indicator: # phone 
numbers in the phonebook 
(2004) / # of households 
Charity gifts: same indicator as 
in the survey, obtained from data 
on tax deductions in 2001. 
Collective 
action 
 Average farm size 1970 (ha)  
Fiscal integration coeff. (2002) 
Conservatism  Conservative vote: results of 
conservative parties at local 
elections (2001). 
Local social networks 
Formal 
sociability 
Association membership: Average number 
of associations each person is a member of. 
Number of associations for 1000 
inhab. 
Informal 
sociability 
Individual network size: average number 
of people the interviewees have a weekly 
conversation with. 
Average household size (1999) 
Density of bars: number of bars 
for 1000 inhabitants (1998). 
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Frequenting bars: percentage of people 
going to bars at least monthly. 
Sport or cultural events: percentage of 
people going to matches or cultural events 
at least monthly. 
Average distance to workplace (km) 
Density of sport equipments: 
number of sport facilities for 
1000 inhabitants (1998) 
Share of commuters: share of 
people working in another 
municipality (1999) 
Outer links and openness 
Personal links Share of natives of the pays 
Individual outer links: average number of 
people outside the pays interviewees have 
a weekly conversation with. 
Seasonal migration: average number of 
days in the year spent outside the pays. 
Moves: percentage of people who moved 
from elsewhere in the last 10 years. 
Natives (1999)  
Share of immigrants (1982-90)  
Recent immigrants (1990-99) 
Business 
networks 
 Head office indicator (1999)  
Backoffice indicator (1999) 
Political 
networks 
(stated) Turnout at latest local elections Turnout at local elections (2001) 
Subsidies received / DGF 
(2002)15 
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Table 4. Interview results and statistical indicators (standard errors in brackets) 
 Saint-Flour Dinan Loire-
Beauce 
Forez Average all 
pays 
Social norms and social homogeneity 
Gini index on household income 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.36 (0.02) 
Refusal rate 31% 46% 43% 39%  
Trust indicator 60% 38% 42% 50%  
Phonebook indicator 81% 79% 68% 78% 72% (9%) 
Lend question indicator 5.05 3.93 5.4 5.85  
Charity gifts declared 40% 45% 20% 36%  
Charity gifts  24% 23% 19% 24% 21% (3%) 
Average farm size 1970 (ha) 30 14 34 14 23 (14) 
Fiscal integration coefficient 18% 32% 0% 21% 23% (13%) 
Conservative vote 77% 38% 45% 47% 45% (12%) 
Local social networks 
Association membership 0.86 0.83 0.32 0.88  
Associations for 1000 inhab. 10.7 5.7 5.6 5.4 6.0 (1.8) 
Individual network size 8.98 8.09 7.31 7.75  
Average household size 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 (0.1) 
Frequenting bars  46% 49% 36% 48%  
Density of bars  1.23 1.31 0.92 0.92 0.99 (0.45) 
Sport or cultural events 76% 85% 54% 90%  
Density of sport facilities 1.95 1.08 1.06 0.87 1.14 (0.45) 
Average distance to workplace 10.6 12.9 10.9 10.8  
Share of commuters 16% 46% 59% 51% 41% (11%) 
Page 34 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 35 
Outer links and openness 
Share of natives 66% 68% 78% 90%  
Individual outer links 5.85 4.3 3.8 3.85  
Seasonal migration 17.3 18.5 16.1 12.9  
Moves in last 10 years 28% 19% 32% 22%  
Share of migrants 1990-99 11% 17% 17% 15% 15% (4%) 
Emigration bridging (1999) 0.704 1.272 1.589 1.149 1.1 (0.2) 
Immigration bridging (1999) 0.652 1.440 2.006 1.671 1.4 (0.4) 
Head office indicator (1999)/1000 0.401 3.612 1.800 2.192 1.6 (3.8) 
Backoffice indicator (1999)/1000 3.347 19.560 14.286 10.766 7.4 (12.5) 
Turnout at latest local elections 86% 77% 86% 84%  
Knowledge of the pays 7% 11% 22% 26%  
Interest in local governance 38% 17% 12% 12%  
Turnout in local elections (2001) 72% 66% 61% 61% 65% (5%) 
Subsidies (2002) 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.43 (0.19) 
 
Page 35 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 36 
 
Table 5. Components of the PCA on the five best bonding variables (inertia in brackets) 
 First component (38%) Second component (21%) Third component (17%) 
Phonebook 0,540 -0,208 -0,268 
Charity gifts 0,318 0,617 0,623 
Inverse farm size 0,352 0,618 -0,520 
Associations 0,467 -0,350 0,484 
Density of bars 0,515 -0,269 -0,188 
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Table 6. Components of the PCA on the five best bridging variables (inertia in brackets) 
 First component (36%) Second component (34%) Third component (20%) 
Emigration 0,681 0,626 0,068 
Immigration 0,548 0,737 0,135 
Head office 0,731 -0,565 0,113 
Back office 0,665 -0,646 0,045 
Subsidies -0,239 -0,051 0,969 
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Table 7. Growth regressions: dependent variable = employment growth 1990-99 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intcpt  -0.353*** -1.164*** -0.159** -0.169*** 
Market potential 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007*** 
Residential 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
Industry 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q/NQ 0.043*** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
Baccalaureat 0.798*** 0.417*** 0.430*** 0.389*** 
Bonding1  0.008*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
Bonding2  0.014*** 0.010** 0.009** 
Bridging1  0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
Bridging2  0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
Bridging3  0.007** 0.006* 0.008* 
Bonding1 * Bridging1   0.001 0.000 
Bonding1 * Bridging2   0.004* 0.004** 
Bonding1 * Bridging3   -0.001 -0.002 
Bonding2 * Bridging1   -0.002 -0.003 
Bonding2 * Bridging2   0.000 0.001 
Bonding2 * Bridging3   0.006** 0.007** 
Bonding1 ^2    -0.002*** 
Bonding2 ^2    0.000 
Bridging1 ^2    -0.003** 
Bridging2 ^2    0.003** 
Bridging3 ^2    -0.001 
R² 0.172 0.203 0.208 0.214 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 Other works on social capital emphasize the importance of a third, intermediary, category, which is termed 
“linking” social capital (Woolcok, 1998). “Linking” involves social links that connect individuals with 
complementary resources or hierarchical relationships. Although this category is conceptually relevant, we did 
not introduce it in this work for both theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, the 
bonding/bridging distinction is already rich enough to understand most mechanisms involved in regional 
development issues. On the practical side, linking is very difficult to distinguish empirically both from bonding 
and from non-social (i.e. “anonymous”) relationships. 
2
 A well known example in development studies is the case when cultural norms forces you to give some part of 
your income to your family. Clearly, nobody will be incited to work efficiently, knowing that he can himself rely 
on others. 
3
 Other measures of social heterogeneity are possible, such as measures of the evenness of social categories. As 
they give similar results to the Gini indicator, they were not discussed here. 
4
 For constructing the phonebook indicator, we assumed that every household had a phone at home. The market 
for fixed phones was liberalized only very recently in France, so our measure of the rate of phone users on the 
phonebook should not be too much distorted. 
5
 The validity of this indicator is probably contextually specific. It would be interesting to see how indicators of 
farm structure perform in other countries. Il is likely that for other European countries, we should find a link 
between co-operation and farm structure indicators. 
6
 This is of course restrictive, as bridging links may be internal to regions. However, restricting bridging to 
external links is a reasonable approximation for rural areas, which are usually considered as being very 
homogenous. Note that the bonding/bridging distinction varies a lot among authors. For example, Beugelsdijk 
and van Schaik (2005) define bridging in a way that would probably be interpreted as bonding by many authors 
(including us). In our case, the advantage of using a very clear-cut representation of bonding and bridging is to 
highlight the fundamental trade-off between cohesion and diversity. 
7
 The number of phone calls/mail exchange between regionswould measure the actual communications that take 
place between a region an the rest of the world. Unfortunately, such an indicator is not available at local levels. 
8
 In May 2005, there were 316 pays, covering about 70% of the French territory. 
9
 However, using figures of the 2000 census does not modify the qualitative results on these study areas. 
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10
 Because the pays do not cover the whole French territory, and their definition lacks statistical 
objectivitybridging indicators were computed at the bassin de vie level (see next section) and then averaged over 
the pays, weighting each unit by its 1999 population. Probit analysis allows to test the significance of various 
determinants in a binary variable. Here, we tested whether there were significant differences between the four 
regions for binary variables such as “Trust indicator” or “Lend question”. The results of probit analysis is 
available upon request at the authors. 
11
 Employment growth may seem a crude indicator of economic performance. However, employment is almost 
the only reliable (and robust) economic measure we can get at such a local level. Unemployment is also 
available, but does not seem to be a very relevant indicator for rural areas. Some authors use professional tax 
base as a proxy for local GDP. Unfortunately, the rules for calculating tax bases change frequently and display 
high biases and spatial variations. Note that using as dependent variables unemployment rate and tax base per 
inhabitant gives results coherent with employment growth concerning social capital variables. 
12
 In our case, principal component analysis allows to extract a “common tendency” from a set of quantitative 
variables. All our variables, though very indirect, share something in common (intensity of sociability in the case 
of bonding, openness to external opportunities in the case of bonding). PCA helps to remove the unwanted 
features of the indicators. A very satisfactory property of the bonding index constructed with the PCA is that it is 
very robust to changes in the list of variables: it changes very little if we add or suppress a few variables. 
13
 All results are available upon request at the author. 
14
 Other potential control variables such as initial employment density, initial per capita income or age structure 
were tested, but were not significant in any regression. 
15
 DGF ( “dotation globale de fonctionnement”) is a transfer from the central government, based on objective 
data linked to the municipalities’ size and needs. 
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